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Abbreviations and Glossary of Key Burmese Terms
ABPO
ABTUC
ABWFL
AFPFL
Ahpwechok 1
Ayeidawpon 2
AITUC
ARO
AS
ASC
ASM
Athin
AUMP
BBC
BBTCL
BIA
BRP 3
BSP
BSPP
Bama Taw-hlan-hmu
Ba La Ma Sa 4
Ba Ta La Sa 5
Bogyoke
BWPP
CPB
Clean AFPFL
DP
DSO
Daw
FTOB
GCBA
HMG
Hsoshelit Wada
ICS
ILO
INA
INC

All-Burma Peasants’ Organisation
All-Burma Trade Union Congress
All-Burma Women’s Freedom League
Anti-Fascist Peoples’ Freedom League
Federation
Revolution
All-India Trade Union Congress
Asian Relations Organisation
Bogyoke Aung San
Asian Socialist Conference
Asia Socialist Movement
Association or Organisation
Auxiliary Union of Military Police
British Broadcasting Corporation
Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd.
Burma Independence Army
Burma Revolutionary Party
Burma Socialist Party
Burma Socialist Program Party
Burma's Revolution
Burma Women’s Freedom Asiayone
Burma Taungthulaithemar (Peasants’) Asiayone
General (usually used of Aung San)
Burma Workers’ and Peasants’ Party
Communist Party (Burma)
The faction led by U Nu, Thakin Tin and Thakin
Kyaw Tun when the AFPFL was split into two
Dictatorship of the Proletariat
Democratic Students’ Organisation
"Mrs": respectful title for Burmese married women
Federation of Trade Organisation (Burma)
General Council of Burmese Association
His/Her Majesty’s Government
Socialism
Indian Civil Servant
International Labour Organisation
India National Army
Indian National Congress

1. Pa Sa Pa La Ahpwechok (AFPFL)= Ah Myo Thar Democracy Ahpwechok (NLD)
2. Saya San's Taungthulaithamar (Peasant's) Ayeidawpon = 1300 (1938-39) Ayeidawpon
3. Also known as the Peoples' Revolutionary Party.
4. Also known as the "All-Burma Women’s Freedom League".
5. Also known as the "All-Burma Peasant's Organisation".
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IOR
IUSY
Kayars
Keibotai
KMT
KNDO
Lokaneiban
LUC
Lanzin
Mah
MI
Marxist League (ML)
MP
NLD
NUF
NW
Nga Pu
PFP
PKI
PRC
PRP
PSP
PVO
Politbureau
Presidium
Pha Ta 6 Pa La
Pha Sa 7 Pa La
Rakhine
Red Flag Communist Party
SEAC
SEATO
SOE
Sinyethar
SI
SLORC
Stable AFPFL
SOAS
Tat (Tatmadaw)
TUCB

India Office Records
International Union of Socialist Youth
Ethnic group, also known as Karenni
Civil Defence
Koumintang
Karen National Defence Organisation
Paradise = Perfect World, the ultimate aim of
Burmese Socialist programs
Leftist Unity Council
Program (Directive)
title used in front of the name of Ethnic Karen (like
Mr.)
Military Intelligence
The organisation including those who emphatically
believed in the ideology of Karl Marx, "Marxism"
Member of Parliament
National League for Democracy
National United Front (in Burmese: y r n w)
Ne Win
Short person (dwarf)
Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party
Partai Komunis Indonesia
People's Republic of China
Peoples’ Revolutionary Party
Praja Socialist Party
Peoples’ Volunteer Organisation
The group holding supreme power in CPB
The group holding supreme power in BSP
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League
Ethnic Arakenese
The party led by Thakin Soe that split from the CPB
in the 2nd CPB Congress on 20th July, 1945
South East Asia Command
South-East Asia Treaty Organization
Special Operation Executive
Proletariat
Socialist International (Second International)
State Law & Order Restoration Council
The BSP group led by U Ba Swe and U Kyaw
Nyein when the AFPFL was split into two
School of Oriental and African Studies
Army
Trade Union Congress (Burma)

6. "Ta" means "attack and destroy". It is softer in sense than "Sa".
7. "Sa" means "oppose or be against".

iii
Thakins
Taline
TA & DA
U
UF
UN
UHRC
Wunthanu
White Flag Communist Party

WFTU
YMBA
Yebaws
Zayat

"Lords" or "Masters"
Ethnic Mon
Travel Allowance and Daily Allowance
"Mr": respectful title for an older Burmese man
United Front (Vanguard of the Revolution)
United Nations
University of Historical Research Commission
Nationalist
The core of the CPB, led by Thakin Thein Pe and
Thakin Than Tun, that remained after Thakin Soe
and his followers split and formed their own Burma
Communist Party.
World Federation of Trade Unions
Young Men’s Buddhist Association
Comrades
Rest-House
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Abstract
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate the legacy and historical significance of the
Burma Socialist Party (BSP), and so, to solve major puzzles for scholars of Burmese
history, particularly with regard to how the links between civilian and military groups in
politics in Burma came about. Thus, this thesis addresses a major gap in the current
historical literature, which has tended to underplay or ignore the role of the BSP. In so
doing this work draws a wide range of interviews, archives and hitherto unused research
sources, as well as the historical analyses in English and Burmese contribute.

The thesis begins by examining the historical and cultural antecedents of the BSP.
The party was formed as a major element of Burma’s independence movement, which
developed from a core group of nationalist leaders. Among these leaders were founders
and key members of the future BSP. The Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (PRP), the prewar version of the BSP, emerged in the struggle for independence and played a key role
in that struggle as a core group around which the future state was founded. After the War,
the BSP came out as separate party to compete with the Communist Party of Burma
(CPB). The Tatmadaw played a key role in this process, and thus the process itself was a
crucial turning point in Burma’s history.

The BSP was the main political party after Burma’s independence in 1948. This
situation can be seen through looking at the way the Anti-Fascist Peoples’ Freedom
League (AFPFL) operated as the umbrella of the BSP. The BSP shaped domestic and
foreign policies in the period 1948-58, and provided the basis of various forms of
government, even at times of internal division. It was in these circumstances that the
military aspect of Burmese politics became important. Careful examination of the sources
dealing with the major political influences of the post-independence period shows that the
Burmese military took their ideas from the BSP and launched their bid for power by
taking over from the BSP.

xi

Introduction
Why, in the period after the fall of the Soviet Empire, should I write a
dissertation on the Burma Socialist Party (BSP)? The end of the USSR coincided with
the dissolution of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), a party which had been
formed on 4 July 1962 and whose rule had lasted from 1962 to 1988. In its initial
form the BSPP was a Revolutionary Council (RC) led by progressive military minds
who had staged a coup. That reflected earlier preparation for a socialist program after
1958 to transform the state from a parliamentary to a socialist system. The BSPP had
links to the BSP, which evolved between 1945 and 1964, and which had existed in
earlier forms since 1939. Such links have rarely been made public. This thesis will fill
the gaps in the Burmese literature on the subject, but more than this, the
historiography appears to have important omissions and distortions. The gaps in the
literature highlight the importance of the central question of this thesis: “To what
extent has the BSP been the central force in modern Burma/Myanmar history”.
In order to answer this question, I will first describe how I researched this topic
because it shows the links between personal experience and the uses of existing
scholarship. Next, I will look at the early history of the BSP, identifying key
personnel, and their influence and memories. This leads into an evaluation and
discussion of the English language scholarly literature on the history of politics in
Burma/Myanmar. I then discuss which methods were used in this thesis. Finally, I
provide an outline of the thesis as a whole, briefly describing each chapter.
The importance of addressing these historical gaps and central argument the
thesis makes is related to the advantages of writing this thesis in Australia. I have
previously worked in the History Department of Rangoon University and of Taunggyi
Degree College from 1986 to 1991 as a Tutor. This teaching job was abolished
because of my participation in the 1988 democracy movement. 1 In 1993, I completed

1. The 1988 democracy movement was initiated by the students’ movement. Amongst the causes of the
movement was the peoples’ suffering, a result of the BSPP government’s de-monetisation of large
currency notes in September 1987. The students’ movement began in March 1988 at the Rangoon
Institute of Technology, and then spread to other campuses in June, leading to the closing of all
universities. In August, there was a general strike not only in Rangoon but also in other cities.
Consequently, there were leadership changes in the ruling BSPP and eventually, General Saw Maung
seized power in September 1988. As a result of military and police actions against students’ and
workers’ demonstrations, many people were killed during this period. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi viewed
the peoples’ demonstrations at night as wrong. The event happened in 1988, therefore, was known as
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my Master thesis on The Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party (1944-1948), the party
that preceded the BSP. I was fortunate, in that family connections allowed me to gain
access to special sources for my research. The former BSP Chairman, U Ko Ko Gyi,
was my grandfather, and U Hla Mon, a Senior Tutor from the History Department at
Rangoon University, my grandfather’s cousin, had worked as his personal bodyguard.
The impetus to research the BSP came from U Hla Mon’s many stories about his
experiences as bodyguard.
When U Ko Ko Gyi died on 5 August 1992, his obituary notice in Burma’s two
newspapers, "Myanmarahlin" (-refrmhtvif;), and the Working Peoples’ Daily, was
censored. Why was he the subject of so much high-level attention? Was the attempt to
omit him from history related to General Ne Win’s legacy, or an attempt to suppress
any mention of the BSP because of its former members’ involvement in the National
League for Democracy (NLD)? There were many ex-members of the BSP of 19481964 in the NLD, including U Aung Shwe (ex-army who became NLD chairman),
Thakin Soe Myint, U Hla Pe, U Than Tun and the late U Chit Khine (ex-army). Or
was this part of a post-Cold War attempt to remove any mention of socialism from the
public face of Burma? It was clear to me from this sensitivity just how important the
history of the BSP was to an understanding of the current situation in Burma. Both the
opposition and the Tatmadaw government consider it necessary to advocate National
Reconciliation (as it is called by the Opposition) or National Reconsolidation (the
term preferred by the Government) in the current unfinished approach to exercising
state power. A common ground in the approach of both sides can be found in the roles
played by civilians and the military in the freedom movement of the first part of the
twentieth century.
Literature on the Subject
There is a wide literature on the history of politics in Burma but as with other
postcolonial literatures, it excludes important elements and does not draw important
conclusions. The weakness of much of the current literature about the BSP is that it is
based on secondary sources and the views of outsiders. Only if one understands the
nucleus of Socialists’ participation in the nationalist movement and subsequently the
“Democracy movement” or “Democracy Ayeidawpon (revolution)”. See for example, the Ex-President
of Burma/Myanmar Dr Maung Maung in his last work, titled the event as “1988 Uprising in Burma”.
See also the 1988 democracy movement of Burma in Vince Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship:
Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004.
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parliamentary system of Burma, can one clearly understands the characteristics of
Burmese politics in the later phase of the Socialist revolutionary struggle over three
decades, and current competition over state power between the ruling military
government and civilian groups. That is a central conclusion of this thesis. Some
scholars may argue that the BSP was only incidental to Burmese history. On the other
hand, there is also significant evidence suggesting an alternative view, and that is
what I aim to investigate here.
A political party is defined generally as an organization, an association, a group,
a type of social relationship. Maurice Duverger defined a party as “a community with
a particular purpose” . Yet he elaborated that a political party is “…not a community
but a collection of communities…”. 2 In fact, the meaning of “a collection of
communities” is not a comprehensive statement of the basis of a political party. In
every society with a state, there is a variety of communities which are not directly
associated with political power but only with the affairs of that community, such as a
religious group. Therefore, a political party is a group of leading individuals and
members who share common aims, principles and ideology, whose intention is to
improve the welfare of all who are live in the state or of specific members, linked
directly or indirectly to exercising state power. In other words, the aim of a political
party is to attain political power directly or indirectly, in order that it can implement
its objectives within society, according to the local environmental and international
circumstances.
The general function of parties is to be the representatives or brokers, for the
collective membership, a mixture of society; to unite the people, the cautious
response, the convincing acts, the repressive moods, the selection of leaders, the
policy-makers, a representation of the government. 3 Some parties persuade the
masses to directly seize state power but some do not. There is a bi-party system in
Britain or the United States and people living in Australia usually concentrate on two
parties- the Labor Party and Liberal Party although there is potential for a multi-party
system. Burma’s two neighbouring countries exhibit different systems. In the east is
China with a single party system controlled by the Chinese Communist Party since

2. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London, Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1964, p. xv, p.17.
3. Roy C. Macridis, Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1967, p.17.
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1949, to the west, the Indian party system has been dominated by the Indian National
Congress (INC) since 1885.
Burma was incorporated into the British-India Empire in 1886 after waging
three Anglo-Burmese Wars. However, the INC in its early years was against the
annexation of upper Burma. 4 There was native resistance to alien rule after the
annexation of the whole of Burma. One source reveals that there were altogether
ninety-six parties, organisations, groups and fronts in the development of the Burmese
party system from 1906 to 1962. 5 This number includes both legal and illegal parties
and organizations which emerged at that period. However, another source assessed
the Burmese party movements for the period of 1950-1962 focussing on four parties,
based on activities around the “government of nation-states”. 6 The second study took
the approach that a party can be defined by how it evolved to representations of
government organised within the state. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the
start of a ‘national ray’ began with the appearance of religious organisations such as
the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (1906) in Burma like the Budi Utomo (1908)
in Indonesia.
Like the Indonesian Sarekat Islam (1912), the Burmese national political
organisation took a western form; with a chairman, vice-chairman, treasurer and EC
members. The General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) emerged in 1919. 7
In the 1920s, the distinguished political groups accepting the British Constitutional
reform of 1923 were the Golden Valley Group led by Sir Maung Gyi and the Twentyone Party led by U Ba Pe. On the other hand, the groups against the reform were the
Party led by U Pu who later became Premier in 1939, U Paw Tun’s Party in which Dr
Ba Maw (who later cooperated with Thakins group in 1930s) was involved, U Chit

4. Basudeo Sharma & Miss Manju Jain, “The Rise and Growth of the Indian National Congress: Ram
Pande, Congress 100 Years, Jaipur: Jaipur Publishing House, 1985, pp.26-30; M. V. Ramana Rao, A
Short History of The Indian National Congress, Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1959, p.8. The first Indian
National Congress was held from 28 to 30 December 1885 in Bombay in which one of its nine
resolutions was that “protest against the annexation of upper Burma”.
5. Robert H. Taylor, "Burma": Haruhiro Fukui (Editor-in-Chief), Political Parties Of Asia and the
Pacific, Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985, pp.99-154. It was noted about ninety-nine parties,
organisations and fronts varied from political, unity, ethnicity, religion and socio-politics. He presented
not only legal but also illegal parties, but he did not count mass organizations. However, I excluded of
three parties which were emerged only after formation of the BSPP (1962).
6. Kenneth Janda, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties,
California: Sage Publications, 1970, p.118: Appendix.
7. Pauker, “The Role of Political Organisations in Indonesia”, pp.129-142.
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Hlaing’s Party and the Party led by U Soe Thein. 8 All these parties or groups had
sprung up in the political era of GCBA and were shadowed by the nationalist
movements of the INC. The 1920s political generation were not willing to request full
independence for Burma and were satisfied with participation in the legislative
administration. They all continued to be active in response to the question of whether
to separate from India or not, and in the election of 1936 following the Government
Act of 1935. At last, Burma was separated from India.
Unlike the gradualist political environment of the 1920s, the next decade saw
dynamic political development beginning with the emergences of the Dobama
Asiayone and the All Burma Youth League in which Ko Nu participated, (who was
later involved in the 1939 pre-war BSP inner circle).9 In the 1930s, the Burmese
political environment was influenced by the Asiayone in the place of GCBA, although
the groups from 1920s were still involved in the Constitutional reform. The
University Students’ union clique which came into the limelight after the Second
Students’ Strike of 1935-36; it coincided with the Asiayone in 1936 and evolved to
some extent into the structure of a mass party with branches in every district or
town. 10 The result of the 1936 election was the formation of the parliamentary wing
of Dobama, the Komin Kochin Party in which Thakin Mya was involved (who was
later became a central leader of the pre-war BSP) and the Fabian Party led by Dedoke
U Ba Cho (who after the War became a chairman for a wing of the BSP, the Workers’
Asiayone). 11 There also existed significant political groups- the Myochit Party led by
U Saw in 1937 and a Marxist Study group in 1938. 12 The split within the Dobama led
to the creation of the “student’s union clique and Dobama thakins” who became
Socialists and Communists in the later national struggles. This nucleus joined hands
with Dr Ba Maw’s Sinyetha Party (Proletariat Party), Dr Thein Maung and U Tun
Aung from the Ngabwintsaing Party (Five-flower posy Party) and, U Ba Oo from the
Naypyidaw Party (Royal City Party) and then founded the Freedom Bloc as the

8. B.K. Drake, Burma: Nationalist Movements and Independence, Singapore: Longman Malaysia,
1979, pp.60-61: Appendix (2).
9. U Maung Maung, From Sangha to Laity: Nationalist Movements of Burma, 1920-1940, New Delhi,
Australian National University: Monographs on South Asia No-4, Swarn Printing Press, 1980,
pp.78-79.
10. Ibid., p.143.
11. Ibid., p.139. The Dobama’s party, the Komin Kochin Party got three seats and the Fabian Party
one.
12. Ibid., p.144, p.239.
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national united front in September 1939. 13 The intention of the group was to follow
the Constitutional reform and recognise Dr Ba Maw as their head. On the other hand,
in November 1939 they formed a central group, employing the English political term
“caucus”, known as the “Underground Party”, with Thakin Mya as its head, in
preparing for armed struggle to achieve Independence. 14 The nationalist movements
of 1930s were more active than in the 1920s. The later generation saw the former as
“corrupt politicians” around the Legislative Council but at last they had chosen Dr Ba
Maw as their leader to gain recognition outside Burma. However, their real leader
from the inner circle was Thakin Mya. 15 The momentum of the movements sharply
increased pressure for Independence from home rule with the welding of the
intellectual class with the students’ union group to the thakins group in 1936.
Only after they had constructed a coalition from three groups—the Burma
Army (Tatmadaw), the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the Peoples’
Revolutionary Party (PRP)—could they challenge colonialism and Japanese fascism
through the national front, the Anti Fascist Organisation (AFO), later known as Anti
Fascist Peoples’ Freedom League (AFPFL). There was a split of Communists’
leadership into two; the CPB led by Thakin Than Tun, and the BCP led by Thakin
Soe after the emergence of separate parties - the Communist Party of Burma in May
1945 and the Socialist Party of Burma in early August 1945. Another para-military
force, the Peoples’ Volunteer Organisation (PVO) emerged in December 1945. In
post-war politics, the political elite of pre-war period such as Dr Ba Maw, U Chit
Hlaing, Myat Thar Tun, Sir Paw Tun, and U Saw attempted to revive their parties
including the Dobama Asiayone with public support in 1920s and the 1930s. 16
However, U Aung San who entered politics from military service and his
AFPFL against the Fascists emerged into the public limelight, so that the old
politicians and their parties were not able to get much public recognition. The AFPFL
13. aen$efAaqG/"-ynfolhta7;awmfyHkygwDordkif;(1939=1946)"/r[m0dZ•mbGJhtwGufwifoGif;aomusrf;/7efukefwuUodkvf/
1984/pm=11//(Nay Nyunt Ba Swe, A History of the Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (1939-1946), M.A
thesis, Rangoon University, 1984, p.11.)
14. Ibid., pp.12-13; Maurice Duverger, op.cit., pp.17-23.
15. Preparatory Committee, Asian Socialist Conference (1952), Report of the Preliminary Meeting for
the Asian Socialist Conference held at Rangoon, 25 to 29 March, 1952, Rangoon: 1952, p.10; aen$efh/
"-ynfolhta7;awmfyHkygwDordkif;"/pm=8/11//(Nay Nyunt, op.cit., p.8, p.11; Taylor, "Burma", p.130. The
collaboration of Dobama group led by Thakin Aung San, Thakin Mya and Thakin Nu with Dr Ba Maw
and other politicians in the formation of Burma Freedom Bloc. Dr Robert Taylor mentioned as
Freedom Bloc.
16. U Maung Maung, Burmese Nationalist Movements, 1940-1948, Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1990, pp.186-187.
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itself was persuaded to include all kinds of people and parties, and thus, the old
veterans - U Ba Pe and Henzada U Mya from U Saw’s Myochit Party, becoming
influential members of the League.17 The British Governors saw an opportunity and
used Thakin Ba Sein and U Saw as a counter-balance to the League. 18
After regaining independence in 1948, there were splits among the nationalist
groups and the result was Burma’s civil war. The main force in the AFPFL, which
was to become the BSP, linked civilian and military groups with the so-called
“Yellow” Peoples’ Volunteer Organisation (PVO) force and other nationalists, to
overcome the CPB and ethnic revolts. The rest of the PVO, “the whites”, had gone
underground in 1948 after a split. The BSP thus appeared crucial to the maintenance
of the sovereignty of the Union of Burma. As a result of ‘Cold War Politics’, the
Burmese Socialists had a major split in 1950 provoked by the Korean War (1950-52).
Thus, it was moving to form a new opposition group in parliament under the AFPFL
government backed up by the BSP. In 1957-58, there was a split in the civilian group
and, the Tatmadaw penetrated into politics to fill the organisational vacuum. They
argued that they did this to defend the interests of the state. Those who emerged as
leaders of the Tatmadaw at this time were a small elite closely connected with the
BSP.
In the development of parties after Second World War, there were fifth stages in
which the BSP was associated with the last stage which included the emergences of
parties in Asia, South East Asia and Africa, except in India and China. At this stage,
the parties in the Western world including Soviet Union and Japan, did not focus
much on ideology but leaned to compromise; whereas the BSP was different based on
ideology derived from Burma/Myanmar. 19 However, the BSP learned its historical
experiences at the third and fourth stage of party development, through socialist
literature. Dr Robert H. Taylor remarked about the Burmese party system “Seldom
has any party had a notable impact on government or society for more than a few
years”. 20 One exception is the BSP. The BSP that existed between 1945 and 1964 and
was preceded from 1939 by the 'Peoples’ Revolutionary Party', the 'Burma
Revolutionary Party', the 'Unit Party' and the 'Underground Movement'. Despite
17. Ibid., p.204; In the conversation with Myawaddi U Ye Gaung.
18. Ibid., p.211, p.223, p.249, pp.271-272: note, 135; Interview with Bo Mya Han on 9.2.1992.
19. Macridis, op.cit., pp.9-16. The first stage is at the beginning of nineteenth century, second after the
middle of the nineteenth century, third before and after the end of the nineteenth century, fourth after
the World War I and the last after World War II.
20. Taylor, "Burma", p.99.
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lasting twenty-five years on the Burmese political scene, its ideas, policies, and
national sentiment remained fresh and green over the four decades of involvement in
the state and its society and continue till the current time. Such claims became evident
from an examining of the BSP’s strengths and weaknesses in comparison with the
INC and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) twenty-five years before the BSP. The
common feature of the three parties is that their emergence was based on the result of
the social and economic conditions under colonial rule. The BSP stood for the
“proletariat class –the peasants and workers, while the PKI represented the
peasantry. 21 In contrast, the INC did not include the class of peasants and workers and
only when Mahatma Gandhi led the Congress in 1920 as a “mass movement” were
the interests of the peasants and workers included. The first priority of the Congress in
its early stage was to unite all within the nation and then asking for reforms to the
bureaucracy run by foreigners. The BSP in a colonial state, became a dual
organisation, both a Mass and Cadre party although it focussed on a cadre party
because leading players of the BSP were heavily involved in the mass organisations.
Being the total membership of party cadres was 219 in 47 branches according to the
Headquarters list following the 1949 reorganisation. 22 There was a slight increase of
four party branches from 43 in 1946 to 47 in 1949. 23 The Party was not able to show
exact membership until 1953 because of the nature of the cadre party. However, the
exact membership number of its mass organisations has been established (See Chapter
Five). The membership dramatically fell when the party was split into two in 1950. In
1956, it was reasonably estimated as near 6,000. 24 Its resources came from the
affiliated (mass) organizations such as Workers’ Asiayone, Peasants’ Asiayone,
Women’s Asiayone, Federation of Trade Unions and Youth. From the beginning, the
Party was a ‘cadre’ party at the centre and as ‘mass’ party in its outer circle. However,
after 1950, it was nearly became an elite or cadre party led by U Ba Swe and U Kyaw
Nyein although it retained the Labour Union (TUCB) links. The Party’s attachment to
21. "-y!folhvGwfvyfa7;(qdk&S,fvpf)ygwD/p!f;rsOf;Oya'"/7efukef/ArmhopfpmyHkEdSyfwdkuf/1946/pm=1// (The Constitution of the
Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party, Rangoon: Bamathick Press, 1946, p.1. in the Introduction.); Justus
M. Van Der Kroef, “Lenin, Mao and Aidit”: The China Quarterly, School of Oriental and African
Studies, 1962, p.43.
22. ocifcspfarmif(twGif;a7;r+;=A[dk-yefvnfpnf;&Hk;a7;aumfrwD/ygwD@mecsKyf)/"(13=12=49)aehpGJtxd-yefvnfzGJhpnf;-yD;aom
ygwDuvmyfpnf;rsm;pm7if;"?(The Report of the Party Cells List signed by Thakin Chit Maung, Secretary of
the Central Reorganisation Committee, 13.12.1949.)
23. Ibid.; OD;AaqG/"Arm-ynfqdk&S,fvpfvrf;n$ef"/7efukef/-ynfolhpmaywdkuf/1953/pm=30//(U Ba Swe, Guide To Socialism In
Burma, Rangoon: Peoples' Literature House, 1953, p.30.)
24. Saul Rose, Socialism In Southern Asia, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p.139.

xix
the masses was becoming weaker. The Congress in the postcolonial state was also a
dual structure with the PKI a cadre party until 1951 and from 1951 onwards it was
increasingly becoming a mass party. Thus, the growth of party membership increased
sharply from 7,910 at the beginning of 1952 to more than 165,000 in 1954. 25
Ideology in Burma/Myanmar can easily be over-ridden by personal loyalties. It
can be said that in the realm of Burmese politics, as in Indonesian politics, personal
relations are sometimes more important than ideology and when a person is loved,
principles are revised (vludkcifawmhrludk_yifw,f/vludkrkef;awmhrludkoHk;w,f?). 26 This proverb
demonstrates an important principle of Burmese politics. The evidence could be seen
in the AFPFL politics after regaining independence. Examples include Bo Let Yar’s
joining (who took part in the study of Marxist and leftist literature in 1939) and
Thakin Nu; the comparing U Ko Ko Gyi’s case with the cases of Thakin Tin and U
Kyaw Myint Lay; the linking of Thakin Tin and Thakin Kyaw Tun with Thakin Nu;
and the recruitment of U Ba Swe (who devoted to Marxism) and U Kyaw Nyein who
was against Marxism. Dr Robert H. Taylor also points to the nature of politics in
Burma/Myanmar by referring to the 1960 election which he asserts was based on a
charismatic political elite rather than party policies. 27
The Congress had been a Centre party in comparison with the two cadre parties,
and although it welcomed the masses in linking with state power, it took the role of
‘compromiser’ between the rulers and masses of the country. In the freedom
movement, the Congress approached the colonial state through Constitutional reforms
by the British. In the 1937 election then they won eight of eleven Provinces. 28 On the
other hand, the BSP chose the revolutionary path and its strategy included founding
the Burma National Army. In the transfer from the colonial state to the postcolonial
state, the Congress was shaped by the colonial state, while the BSP turned the
Government Act of 1935 upside-down working to transform the colonial state and
rejecting membership of the British Commonwealth. The success of the Congress was
due to a balance “…between agitational unity and the unity and stability of the

25. Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1974, pp.48-49, p.64.
26. Guy J. Pauker, “The Role of Political Organisations in Indonesia”: Far Eastern Survey: American
Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. XXVII, No.9, September 1958, p.129.
27. Robert H. Taylor, "Burma": Haruhiro Fukui (Editor-in-Chief), Political Parties Of Asia And the
Pacific, Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985, p.99.
28. V.M. Sirsikar & L. Fernandes, Indian Political Parties, Meerut: India, Academic Press, 1984,
pp.62-65.
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state…”. 29 For the PKI, it diverted from the freedom struggle because of the
circumstances of the international communist movement and thus, it was recorded in
Indonesian history as having “stabbed the Republic in the back”. 30 In the practical
sense of foreign relations, Indonesia followed the “Neutralist Policy” like India and
Burma, by refraining from the two power blocs led by Russia and the U.S.A, and
creating united internal forces and defending the International Communists’
movements. Thus, the Indonesian postcolonial state was transformed from the old
colonial Dutch state to a new state favouring the “Non-Alignment Policy”. In this
domestic ground, the PKI led by Aidit in the 1950s, like the BSP led by Thakin Mya
in the 1940s who assumed leadership of the AFPFL, used the tactic of the strategy of
the “United National Front” to form an alliance with the nationalist figure of Sukarno
and other progressive forces. For the party’s finances, the Congress collected its funds
not only from its members within the wealthy class and masses, but also as a ruling
party from business, industrial houses and private contributions. 31 Both the PKI and
the BSP had experience with securing funds illegally. In the postcolonial state, the
BSP had recruited wealthy merchants as a major financial source, while the PKI got
assistance from the Chinese Embassy (PRC). 32 The similarity of the PKI and the BSP
in their ideological evolution included the influences of Marxism, Leninism,
Stalinism and Maoism, and the ideas of Marshal Tito. While accepting ideas from
outside world, both of the two parties developed according to their own soil and
water. 33 The Congress chose the middle path of ideology, while the other two parties
were explicitly ‘leftists’.
In comparing the role of the army for the PKI and the BSP, the most outstanding
feature is that the latter was support by the state army while the tense relationship
between the army and the Communists intensified since the Madium rebellion in
September 1948. The difficult situation between the Communist organizers and the
military could not be found in the top elite group but at the base level of local areas towns and villages. The PKI’s strategy was blocked by the Indonesian army headed

29. Dietmar Rothermund, “Constitutional Reforms versus National Agitation in India, 1900-1950”:
The Journal of Asian Studies, 1962, p.518.
30. Peter Edman, Communism A La Aidit: The Indonesian Communist Party Under D.N. Aidit, 19501965, Queensland, Australia, James Cook University Press, 1987, pp.21-22.
31. Ramana Rao, op.cit., pp.97-98; Sirsikar & Fernandes, op.cit., pp.225-229.
32. Mochtar Lubis, “The Indonesian Communist Movement Today”: Far Eastern Survey: American
Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. XXIII, No.11, November 1954, pp.163-164.
33. Mortimer, op.cit.; Kroef, “Lenin, Mao and Aidit”.
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by the Army Chief of Staff A. H. Nasution. The army did not want to let Communists
control the state, especially in a power-vacuum. 34 Conversely, the military elite was
involved in the formal foundation of the BSP. They supported whatever the party had
planned and its programs in the struggle for freedom, and even proposed to stage a
coup for the party in 1948. In the power vacuum of 1957-58 based on civilian politics,
the party itself did not object to the army re-entering politics.
Some authors have noted aspects of the history of the BSP and the parties that
preceded it. Even in the writing of the BSP history itself in the era of Asian Socialists’
development in the 1950s, the party refrained from publicising its influential role in
the Burmese politics, especially in the attempts to attain leftist unity but recorded it
under personal names and some associations. 35 My work will provide more details of
how to understand socialists’ attempts to maintain national unity in the era of the Cold
War. The party put AFPFL first in its own history—this is a source of many
misconceptions. Moreover, the CPB, a rival to the BSP in the civil war, reviews the
past not to consider principles but to vent personal dissatisfaction, a usual
characteristic of Burmese politics.36
Norman Nyun-Han, a son of Dr Ba Han, the brother of former World War Two
Prime Minister Dr Ba Maw, submitted his PhD thesis—Burma’s Experiment in
Socialism—to the University of Colorado in 1970. He examined socialism in Burma
up to 1970. He presented the now conventional view of the relationship between
socialism and politics when he stated in his thesis that "Socialism in Burma can
therefore be said to be more or less an extension of Burmese Nationalism". 37 I agree
with his statement but it is far too simplistic. I would argue that Burmese socialism
deserves stronger recognition as a cornerstone of nationalism. If it can be said that
Burmese nationalism is two steps forward from patriotism, then Burmese socialism is
one step forward from nationalism. Later Chapters will explore this judgment. In his
account of the origins of socialism in Burma, Norman Nyun-Han argued that
socialism was already rooted in ancient Burmese tradition. In this thesis I will follow

34. Guy J. Pauker, “The Role of Political Organisations in Indonesia”: Far Eastern Survey: American
Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. XXVII, No.9, September 1958, pp. 140-141.
35. U Ba Swe, Guide To Socialism In Burma, Rangoon: Supdt., Govt. Printing and Staty., Union of
Burma, 1956, pp.51-52.
36. "-y!folhtm%m*sme,f"/trSwf(21)/rwf/2002/pm=12?(People's Power Journal, No.21, March 2002, p.12.)
37. Norman Nyun-Han, Burma's Experiment In Socialism, PhD thesis, University of Colorado, 1970,
p.19.
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up this claim by examining ancient Burmese society and also present the case of how
socialism was seen as a form of Pali (Sanskrit).
Despite the value of his work, it is notable that Norman Nyun-Han mentioned
the history of the BSP in only ten pages of one chapter. By contrast, my research
questions his view of the party’s origins and offers evidence to counteract his
statement that “The Burma Socialist Party (BSP) is the post-war reincarnation of the
pre-war Burma Revolutionary Party (BRP) founded in 1939...Its founders had not
intended to organize such a party, and it was, in fact, a creature of circumstance
whose birth was necessitated by an unexpected emergency". 38 However, as I will
show, the emergence of the PRP came out of the efforts of patriots, including the
student elite and the thakins, responding to the social and economic situation under
colonialism. In the PRP's analysis, the two previous anti-colonial struggles, known as
the Saya San Ayeidawpon (the Saya San uprising of 1930) and the 1300 Ayeidawpon
(the peasants’, workers’ and students’ strikes of 1938-1939) had failed because of
their lack of arms and an army, so they saw military aid from outside as a
precondition for independence. These two events entered official national
historiography in the late 1940s and are still commemorated as part of national
history. 39
Further, Nyun-Han was unclear about how to represent relationships within the
government. He argued that in 1949 the Socialists were forced to resign en bloc from
the government because of adverse public opinion. 40 There is no doubt adverse public
opinion had been aroused because of the “40 Lakhs” case, but the resignation of the
BSP (and the remnant PVO) was to pave the way for a settlement of the Civil War,
especially by welcoming the CPB back into the legal fold. As I will show, there were
many discussions among the BSP, the PVO and General Ne Win behind the scenes
regarding the strategy of resigning and holding debates. This can be seen in the
formation of two groups. One, led by Thakin Chit Maung (Tharrawaddy), who agreed
with the resignation, the other, led by Bo Khin Maung Gale, who did not. U Kyaw
Nyein was against resigning, and argued that the case had to be rethought, and at first

38. Ibid., p.302.
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40. Ibid., p.307.
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Prime Minister U Nu himself did not agree with the resignations from the BSP and
the PVO. 41
In the analysis of the BSP's class structure, my work follows in the steps of Dr
Robert H. Taylor in his PhD thesis, The Relationship Between Burmese Social
Classes And British-Indian Policy On The Behaviour Of The Burmese Political Elite,
1937-1942, submitted in 1974. In that treatise, he argued that all the Socialists in
Burma come from the middle class. 42 Robert H. Taylor supported Nyun-Han's view
of the Burmese roots of socialism. Taylor's concentration in his writings is on the
CPB, Thakin Soe and Thein Pe Myint. By contrast, I give more attention to Thakin
Mya and other Socialist leaders. 43 I argue, after I examined the reading lists of the
nationalist leaders who later became the post-war leaders of the BSP, that they read
rather more widely than has been usually asserted. The revolutionary Marxists and
Leninists of the Dobama Asiayone learned their ideologies from British writers like
John Strachey, the publications of Victor Gollancz's Left Book Club and the
theoretician of the British Communist Party, R. Palme Dutt. 44 There is also indication
of the reading lists of 1920s and 1930s in colonial Burma by uncovering the Nagani
Book Club. 45
More credibility can be ascribed to views of frequent changing horses and the
name of the BSP. I explain how the Party changed its name step-by-step: the BSP and
then the PFP in 1945; then the BSP in 1948; then the Union of Socialist Party in 1949
and then the BSP until 1964. I explore the BSP’s changing in leadership as four times
including the Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein period before the arrival of Leader Mya at
Rangoon; Mya’s period of 1945-1947; Ko Ko Gyi’s period of July 1947- July 1948;
and then Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein’s period until the termination of the Party in 1964.
These name changed reflect the changing ideology and leadership in the BSP.
However, in his article, Burma: Political Parties Of Asia And The Pacific, Dr Robert
41. Unpublished notes by Thakin Hla Kyway. In the conversation, which I double checked in an
interview with one of the participants at the meetings, Thakin Chit Maung (Tharrawaddy).
42. Robert Henry Taylor, The Relationship Between Burmese Social Classes And British-Indian Policy
On the Behaviour Of The Burmese Political Elite, 1937-1942, PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1974.
43. Robert H. Taylor, Marxism And Resistance in Burma, 1942-1945: Thein Pe Myint's Wartime
Traveler, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1984; Taylor, Robert H., The State In Burma, Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1987.
44. Taylor, Marxism And Resistance in Burma, p.215.
45. a':at;oDwm/"e*g;eDpmayESifhudkvdkeDacmwf-refrmhEdkifiHa7;"/a'gufwmoef;xGef;.vkyfaz:udkifzufrsm;/Armhordkif;[if;av;/
rEWav;wuUodkvf(ordkif;@ge)/19==/pm=174=188?(Daw Aye Thida, "Nagani Literathres and Burmese Politics in
Colonial Period": The Colleagues of Dr Than Tun, Studies In Burmese History, Mandalay: Mandalay
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H. Taylor tends to overlook how changes to the BSP’s name worked step-by-step
with changing Burmese politics. He also jumped one step ahead to the role of
Chairman Ko Ko Gyi in the period between Thakin Mya and U Ba Swe. He wrote
that the founders of the BSP were non-communist nationalists. I will show that the
two founder members - U Ko Ko Gyi and Thakin Lwin came from the Communist
environment. 46
I reveal how Thakin Mya came into the limelight among the young patriotic
group in line with two Burmese works—Maung Ye Mya's MA thesis, An Analysis of
the Political Role of Thakin Mya submitted in 1982, and Thakin Chit Maung
(Waidura), one of the CEC members in the foundation of the BSP in September 1945,
National Leader Azarni Thakin Mya published in 1979. 47
In the analysis of the Socialists’ idea in late 1930s to form an army to fight for
independence, I point out that the national sentiment of the Burmese was in line with
the writings of two members of the Burmese elite 48 , two historians from Southeast
Asia 49 , and some British historians 50 in which they under-estimated the native spirit
for military service. In the published work (2000) by Parimal Ghosh, Brave Men of
the Hills: Resistance and Rebellion in Burma, 1825-1932, there is no indication of
linking military history to main historiography of political parties. 51
In addressing the works done by the PRP, in an examination of the collaboration
with the fascist Japanese, to critics of the CPB and the western outlook, there is a
focus on the BSP's insider's point of view and I develop the view that the people were
suffering from persecution by the Japanese military police, and they supported their

46. Taylor, "Burma", pp.120-122.
47. armif7J-r/"ocif-r.EdkifiHa7;aqmif7Gufcsufrsm;udkqef;ppfavhvm-cif;(1920=1947)"/r[m0dìmbGJh,lusrf;/7efukefwuUodkvf/
1982?(Maung,Ye Mya, An Analysis of the Political Role of Thakin Mya, MA thesis, Rangoon
University, 1982.); ocifcspfarmif(0d"l7)/"trsdK;om;tmZmenfacgif;aqmifjuD;ocif-r"/(y)judrf/7efukef/rdom;pkpmay
-zefhcsDa7;/1979/pm=35?(Thakin Chit Maung (Waidura), National Leader Azarni Thakin Mya, First Edition,
Rangoon: Meettharsu Press, 1979, p.35.)
48. Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967; U Ba Than
(Dhammika, Retired Colonel), The Roots of The Revolution, Rangoon: the Government Printing Press,
1962.
49. Sunait Chutintaranond & Than Tun, On Both Sides Of The Tenasserim Range: History of SiameseBurmese Relations, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Phyathai: Asian Studies Monographs No. 050,
1995.
50. G.E Harvey, British Rule In Burma, 1824-1942, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1946; F.S.V
Donnison, Burma, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
51. Parimal Ghosh, Brave Men of the Hills: Resistance and Rebellion in Burma, 1825-1932, Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2000.
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own army, the Burma Independent Army (BIA). 52 Trager recorded the PRP as BRP.
As well he pointed out that the Burmese never considered their collaboration with the
Japanese as a moral failure but looked forward to it as a means of gaining
independence. 53
After the emergence of the PFP in September 1945, in the periodisation of
historiography, the Socialists suggested three periods of organising people to follow
the party’s program. However, Josef Silverstein wrote in his book, Burmese Politics:
The Dilemma of National Unity that there was no time limit placed on the second
period. 54 I will show the time limit Socialists referred to, in the party’s organ, The
Socialist Front Weekly Journal.
In the analysis of the BSP's role in the freedom movements of Burma, I argue in
Chapter Six that the BSP had already developed friendly relationships with the ethnic
peoples through their elite leaders, although I recognise the role of Thakin Nu in the
Union as a leading national figure. But, Maung Maung Gyi in his PhD thesis appeared
to ignore the real force of the relationship between the BSP and ethnic peoples. 55 On
the other hand, I support Maung Maung Gyi's writings in his PhD thesis that there
was amongst Socialists’ a humble spirit in their works for the state rather than the
party and perseverance to preserve the Union. 56 Thompson and Adloff also over
emphasise on the intention of the "Leftist Unity" by the BSP as party's interest. 57 I
will show their reliance on good intention to get unity among the left wingers. Mary
P. Callahan also wrote in her book: Making Enemies: War and State Building in
Burma, the success of the BSP and resulted from the party joining hands with its two
mass organisations: Workers’ Asiayone and Peasants’ Asiayone, to keep loyalty to
the AFPFL government. 58 I will support her argument.

52. odef;az-rifh/"awmfvSefa7;umvEdkifiHa7;tawGhtjuHKrsm;"/7efukef/a7$-y!fwefpmyHkESdyfwdkuf/1956/pm=31/33?(Thein Pe Myint,
His Political Experiences During the Revolution, Rangoon: Shwepyiton Press, 1956, p.31, p.33);
AaqG("g;0,f)/"qdk7S,fvpfArm-y!fxlaxmifavmh"/pm=16/18?(Ba Swe, Socialist Burma, p.16, p.18.); Interview with U
Kyaw Nyein, Mss/Eur D 1066/2 (British Library, London).
53. Trager, op.cit., pp.57-61.
54. Josef Silverstein, Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1980, p.178; "qdk&S,fvpfwyfOD;*sme,f"/twGJ(1)/trSwf(5)/16/1/1946?(The Socialist Front Weekly
Journal,Vol. I, No.5, 16.1.1946.)
55. Maung Maung Gyi, An Analysis Of the Social and Political Foundations Of The Burmese
Executive (1948-1956), PhD thesis, Yale University, 1958, p.188.
56. Ibid., p.191.
57. Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, The Left Wing In Southeast Asia, First Edition, New York:
William Sloane Associates, 1950, p.105.
58. Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 2004, p.141.
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In her PhD thesis, The Origins of Military Rule in Burma (Cornell University,
1996) Callahan discussed the role of the military in ruling Burma, but she was unable
to uncover the deep relationship between military and civilian groups by connecting
the BSP and the Tatmadaw (military) elite group. 59 By contrast, my work will analyse
the relations between these two power groups. In Callahan’s published book in 2004,
Making Enemies, Callahan also wrote about the military history of Burma (18261962), placing considerable emphasis on military-war and postcolonial state-society
in Burma as an “empirical” result rather than the result of military ideals in the
building of the state. I argue in Chapter Eight that the socialist military elite group
started their ideology, in coincidence with the emergence of the BSP in 1945 and
passed through until 1949 and then, in 1957-58 they prepared to review the 1947
Constitution for the 1962 Socialist Revolution and trained leading cadres since 1958.
Moreover, Mary Callahan gave little weight to the success of civil society with
the neutralism of Burma and the BSP role in Asian Socialist movements which started
in 1952. By contrast, she covers the military history during the period from 1950 to
1962. I fill this gap in Chapter Seven with outlining the BSP's success. The current
military articles included in the newspaper, The New Light Of Myanmar are also
contradicted because the military government failed to mention the role of the civilian
Prime Minister and the role of BSP at that time when they praised the Bandung spirit
and attended the Commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of the Asian-African
Conference 1955. When they made a friendship relationship with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), the five principles of peaceful coexistence were also
revealed. 60 It is notable that the current military regime is copying the heritage of the
BSP and its shell.
Some scholars might argue that the military involvement was just support from
Tatmadaw that produced the reincarnation of the PRP, the PFP in 1945. 61 Yet such a
59. Mary Patricia Callahan, The Origins Of Military Rule In Burma, PhD thesis, Cornell University,
1996.
60. Website: HYPERLINK “http://www.myanmar.com” http://www.myanmar.com:
atmifrdk;pH/"tm&S=tmz7duxdyfoD;nDvmcH/tm&S=tmz7duuGefz7ifhtxdrf;trSwf a7$7wktcrf;tem;ESifh&dk;om;yGif;vif;aom-refrmEdkifiH
7Jhoabmxm;"/9/5/2005//(Aung Moe San, Asia-Africa Summit, the Commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of
the Asian-African Conference 1955 and Myanmar's Policy on the Summit); The New Light Of
Myanmar, 6.7.2005: When SPDC Prime Minister General Soe Win went to People's Republic of
China, he mentioned the 55th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Myanmar relations in which
included the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the fact: "Myanmar is among the first
nations that acknowledge People's Republic of China since its proclamation". Note. He failed to
mention, Which period, Who's reigning and Which party gave this policy?
61. aen$efh/"-y!folta7;awmfyHkygwDordkif;"/pm=190?(Nay Nyunt, op.cit., p.190.)
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view acknowledges Tatmadaw’s deep involvement in the foundation of the PFP and
then the BSP, and does not compare the role of the PRP to the strategy of the CPB, as
I do in Chapter Two. I also show in Chapter Six how the Tatmadaw men gave strong
support to the party and how they created mutual understanding between the BSP and
Tatmadaw men was achieved in the period 1945-57. Mary Callahan draws on Nay
Nyunt's thesis but this is misleading because it conforms to official historiography
which elides essential elements. I have already mentioned the shortcomings of my
own thesis on the PFP, while another MA thesis from Rangoon University, by Pa Pa
Oo, is limited in its scope and in its access to sources. Neither can answer the key
questions posed in the present dissertation about the relationship of the BSP to the
state. 62
In the last book written by former President Dr Maung Maung, a biographer of
U Ne Win, the author devotes only one sentence to the close relationship between the
Socialists and the Prime Minister in the Nu period. 63 There was only one further
sentence explaining the Army’s deep involvement in the politics and administration of
the country from the very early years after independence. 64 It may be assumed that he
knew what had happened, but was perhaps constrained by the situation of writing and
could only provide hints for other researchers.
In contrast claims were made on the basis of the forty-one pages written by
former BSP Joint Secretary, Bo Aung Gyi, who said that Bo Tin Pe, Bo Than Sein
and Bo Kyaw Soe had little knowledge of socialist ideology and that they studied
only the notes used by U Ko Ko Gyi for his seven-day socialist ideology course held
in 1945 when the BSP (Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party) was first founded. 65
In writing the history of Tatmadaw in 1995, there are two reasons for the coup
in 1962 by the military revolutionary group: the Shan Federalism and the Socialist

62. ausmfaZmf0if;/"_ynfolhvGwfvyfa7;(qdk7S,fvpf)ygwDordkif;(1944=1948)"/r[m0dZ•mbGJ,lusrf;/7efukefwuUodkvf/1993?(Kyaw
Zaw Win, A History of the People’s Freedom (Socialist) Party (1944-1948), MA thesis, Rangoon
University, 1993.); yyOD;/"-refrmEdkifiHordkif;wGifqdk7S,fvpfygwD.tcef;*è(1940=1950)"/r[m0dZ•mbGJ,lusrf;/
7efukefwuUodkvf/1996//(Pa Pa Oo, The Role of the Socialist Party in Burma’s History (1940-1950), MA
thesis, Rangoon University, 1996.)
63. Dr Maung Maung, ex-President of Burma, mentioned in The 1988 Uprising in Burma, New Haven:
Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph 49, 1999, p.12.
64. Ibid., p.16.
65. The Former Brigadier Aung Gyi wrote a series of letters to U Ne Win, in 1988 which were
especially critical of some BSPP's executive members; content of the letters was made public.; Martin
Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2nd Impression, London: Zed Books Ltd, 1993,
pp.449-450, foot-note: 11.
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Construction. 66 My argument in Chapter Eight is leaning towards an ideological point
of view rather than ethnic Shan problem. It provides new information about how
Burmese authoritarianism gradually developed in Burma after the Second World War.
An article in the 'New Light of Myanmar' during the SLORC period in 1992,
exemplifies the failure to recognise the combined role of the BSP and the Tatmadaw
in fighting colonialism. In this article, Tat’s role is described as the main force behind
Burma's aid to Vietnam. In fact, the BSP saw itself as fulfilling the desires of the
assassinated national heroes. In the period of the BSPP (1962-1988), when cadres
from the BSPP visited these countries on official visits, the host countries proclaimed
thanks for this assistance. At that time, the cadres didn't know how to respond,
because the relations the BSP had established with Vietnam were not acknowledged
in the history of the BSP and the Tatmadaw. When the former General Secretary of
the BSP, U Ba Swe, heard that news, he remarked, "They don't know who is their real
father".
The reason that these relations had not been made public, was that within the
BSP in 1947-48, the social democrat group considered assistance to Vietnam and
Indonesia as leaning to the communist groups and therefore kept it secret, although U
Kyaw Nyein had mentioned the help given to the Viet Minh at the Asia Socialist
Conference. 67 Nevertheless, the aid given to Indonesia became the basis for an
historical friendship, which is explained in Chapter Seven. 68 Within the BSP, the
Cold War was already beginning to have a strong effect, and this effect was to cloud
the internal ideological formulations of the party, as revealed in its own historical
records.
Methodology
In writing this dissertation, I have used the method of the Greek historian
Herodotus, to cross-question and cross-examine eye-witnesses. 69 Both my Burmese

66. ppfordkif;-ywdkufESifhwyfrawmfarmfuGef;wdkufr+;&kH;/"wyfrawmfordkif;/pwkwàwGJ/1948=1962"/7efukef/owif;ESifhpme,fZif;vkyfief;/
1996/pm=266//(The Office of Military Historical Museum and Tatmadaw Archive, A History of
Tatmadaw, Vol. IV, 1948-1962, Rangoon: Information Department, 1996, p.266.)
67. Report of the Second Meeting of the Bureau of the Asian Socialist Conference held at Hyderabad
(India), 10 to 12 August 1953. Burmese delegate, U Kyaw Nyein, admitted that "The Socialist Party
and Government of Burma had maintained close relations with the Viet Minh Movement in the past.
Although the Viet Minh consisted of some communist elements, the Movement was predominantly a
nationalist one".
68. Interview with Daw Khin Pyone on 26.10.2001.
69. Norman Austin, The Greek Historians, New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Company, 1969,
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and Australian teachers urged me to re-examine the information and opinions from
the interviews for bias. 70 For those reasons I began with the autobiographical account
of former BSP Chairman U Ko Ko Gyi, the unpublished documents by Thakin Hla
Kyway, the Diary of Thakin Hla Kyway, and the primary sources from Thakin Hla
Kyway’s library. The interviews with my grandfather, a leading figures such as
former Brigadier Tin Pe, and others who played important roles in the BSP and
related groups, were then supplemented with a variety of primary sources, in
particular archives in London and the sources collected by International Institute for
Social History (IISG), Amsterdam.
I have kept my promises that I would only reveal information from some
interviewees after they died, and to only use some of the material revealed to me as
unsourced background material, just as a number of the interviewees requested. 71 As I
mentioned previously, some of my material was obtained on the assumption by others
that my grandfather had already told me about these matters. I got the unpublished
notes of Thakin Hla Kyway very early in my research, and I would like to have asked
my grandfather many more questions that arose from them, but sadly his death
prevented this. Some of the ex-politicians whom I interviewed requested that what
they told me should only be revealed after their deaths, so I could not use their
material in my MA thesis, although I am able to do so now. One of them, former
Brigadier Tin Pe, who had helped General Ne Win organise the 1962 coup that
brought the government preceding the BSPP to power, insisted on dictating his
account. Former Brigadier Aung Gyi 72 said that he did not want the history of the
BSP to be uncovered while U Ne Win was still alive, but he arranged an interview
with U Kyaw Myint Lay, one of the founders in the BSP. 73 I was also able to
pp.27-41; Carolyn Dewald, “Practical knowledge and the Historian’s Role in Herodotus and
Thucydides” in Antony E. Raubitschek, The Greek Historians: Literature and History, California:
Department of Classics, Stanford University, Anma Libri & Co., 1985, pp.47-48. Herodotus was born
early in the fifth century B.C. He was regarded as the Father of History. His method was to narrate
what actually happened in the recent human past based on still accessible memory. He always reminds
his readers to be sceptical on his work, a method learnt in MA classes of Prof. Saya U Tun Aung
Chain.
70. In particular I would like to thank Saya Dr Toe Hla and Saya Dean Prof. Dr Andrew Wells.
71. Since some interviewees would not allow me to take notes, where I am unsure of the details they
related to me I have indicated this in the thesis with “?”
72. Not a main supporter for the 1962 Coup although he was listed in the revolutionary council as a
secondary figure. U Aung Gyi was confined, along with Former Colonel Ba Than, at the War Office,
Rangoon at the time of the Coup, according to Former BSP Chairman U Ko Ko Gyi (as retold by
Former Colonel Ba Than).
73. U Kyaw Myint Lay founded the party led by U Aung Gyi in 1988 along and contested the 1990
election.
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interview other ex-politicians, cross-questioning each in relation to other accounts,
and against contemporary newspapers and books. I am in the fortunate position of
being able to draw on both Burmese and English sources. I also read unedited
interviews plus help additional conversations from Burmese politicians. Therefore,
the method used in this thesis is the fruitful result of examining the triangular
relationship between interviews, primary documents from private and Library
collections and historical evidence from newspapers and journals. However, I remind
all readers that they should be sceptical about my work, as I remain faithful to
Herodotus’s method.

Summary of Chapters
My thesis concentrates on the decades between the 1930s and 1964. Chapter
One aims at providing an understanding of why the Burmese revolutionaries created
an underground party, one of the pre-conditions for understanding what led to the
creation of the Socialist Party of Burma or BSP. Once a party had been created, the
next question is, who should lead it? Thus I look at the emergence of the pre-war
political leaders, who were also to lead the country in the post-war period. But this
analysis does not tell us “why socialism”, so I have analysed why the Burmese
nationalist movement took a socialist form. In doing this I have drawn on previous
literature that exists in a relatively scattered form on the subject. My study shows that
the Nationalist movement adopted Socialist forms because of the class composition of
Burma, in particular because of the class backgrounds of the leadership, an issue that
has been partly examined by Robert H. Taylor in his study of Burmese political elites
in the colonial era. 74 One element that needs to be added to the picture of the social
background that produced the BSP is the importance of Tats or military groups under
colonialism.
Chapter Two is concerned with the emergence of the underground party, the
PRP, and its reincarnation as the Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party after World War
Two. I look at impact of the war on the former student leaders and those known as the
Thakins. There are significant differences that emerged at that time between the
Communists and other revolutionary groups. Such differences were produced both by
ideology and by strategic views on whether it was more important to fight colonialism
or fascism at that time. One of the key differences lay in the CPB’s emphasis on
74. Taylor, op.cit..
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ideology, as opposed to the PRP/PFP group who argued that support from the masses,
peasants and workers, had not been enough to defeat British imperialism, without the
essential element of arms. The young patriotic men known later as PRP, founded the
Burma Freedom Bloc legally and, simultaneously they formed the underground
Burma Revolutionary Party or Peoples’ Revolutionary Party in order to obtain foreign
military assistance. They found it from the Japanese, and so from the latter group
became the Thirty Heroes, who included Bogyoke Aung San and Bogyoke Ne Win.
The key players and followers of the PFP/BSP are discussed in Chapter Three.
In this account, the builders of the party, military and civilian personnel are
categorised to get a clear image of the Party’s composition, although some of them
were involved in both roles. The party’s connection with the ethnic peoples and
involvement of women are also analysed because of their significance in the freedom
movements and the State’s construction.
Chapter Four examines the writing of the constitution of the PFP/BSP, and the
structure, organisation and funding of the PRP/PFP/BSP. In so doing, I compare it
with the characteristics of the Socialist Party (India). I will ask: what elements gave
rise to conflict within Burmese socialism and, what are the legacies of the BSP in the
past? The 1947 Constitution was important to the BSP because of its advocacy of
social revolution. Therefore, Chapter Five will examine the BSP’s implementation of
socialism in the economic and social fields. This chapter will look at factors in the
formation of the BSP that led to continuing ideological differences within the party,
especially in relation to the splits of 1948 and then 1950. These splits have to be seen
in the light of different attitudes towards Burma’s Civil War and then the maintenance
of democratic government in the 1950s.
The reflections of the BSP’s policies are still evident in Burmese/Myanmar
politics and thus, the strategies and tactics for both internal and external relationships
of Burma, are revealed in Chapter Five, which will be connect to chains in Chapter
Seven. In this account, there is a need to glean from diverse sources such as the
primary speeches by key players, the BSP’s documentary books, and valuable
interviews.
Chapter Six then evaluates the role of the PFP and its successor, the BSP, in
Burmese politics between 1945 and 1962. This chapter looks at the party’s role in the
national front, the AFPFL, during the struggle for independence, and then in the
subsequent struggle for national unity. The AFPFL was not a party proper, but a
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national front, as the name implies. From the need to provide national unity derived
the BSP strategies to organise and mobilise over 135 ethnic groups of Burma. I will
also examine the party’s attitude to the ethnic question. The AFPFL could not contain
the differences between the CPB and the BSP. It was the split of the CPB into two
communist parties (the Red Flags and the White Flags) and their expulsion from the
AFPFL, that gave the opportunity for the BSP to emerge on the centre stage of
Burmese politics.
However, there were still other significant differences among the members of
the AFPFL in the struggle for independence, particularly over the role of armed
struggle during World War Two. The CPB at the time followed the strategy of
Browderism, which meant that they urged the Socialists, who were still hiding arms
for a revolution against the British, to hand over all the arms to the Allied army. Later,
under the leadership of Thakin Mya, not only the AFPFL but also the BSP shifted to
the path of negotiation by entering into the Governor Council, attending the London
talks for independence, and holding the April Election and Constituent Assembly.
But, at the same time, they had prepared a contingency plan if negotiations failed, one
that involved armed struggle. 75 Sources disagree as to whether these internal struggles
were connected to the assassination of Bogyoke Aung San and the other leaders in
July 1947.
Chapter Seven reveals that a significant element of the BSP’s role in
government was its international role. This has not previously been carefully
examined in the secondary literature. Independent Burma played a key role in the
Cold War, not because of the strength of its communist parties, but because of its
leadership in the Asia Socialist group, leading to the attempt to break away from the
two power blocs that dominated international politics, in the form of the Asia-Africa
or Third World movement. The Cold War, however, had internal effects on the BSP,
and these led to a division in the Party. This grew out of U Nu’s rejection of Marxism
within the AFPFL, which came to factionalise the BSP.
This factionalism led to the Coups of 1958 and 1962, as I will show in my
examination of the role of the Tatmadaw (Military) in the BSP, in Chapter Eight. The
future military leadership of Burma had been involved in the formation of the BSP
since the days of the PRP. During the resistance to the Japanese, a clique of the
75. Myawaddi U Ye Gaung, who was involved in the hiding of arms, has circulated documents
publicly amongst the Burmese community in Australia concerning this matter.
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Tatmadaw within the PRP evolved. Members of this same group were main players in
the foundation of the PFP and then the BSP, although they were still in the army and
so were not publicly members of the Party. This Tatmadaw group argued that it had to
serve the state in the Civil War by joining together with the BSP. The Tatmadaw
regarded the split of the AFPFL in 1958 as a power vacuum and thus staged a coup
apparently sanctioned by the Prime Minister, U Nu. Some members of the 1958 Coup
group in the Tatmadaw remained linked to the BSP, and they split from the other
military faction in 1961 over ideological matters. This split may have made the 1962
Coup possible.
There were obviously many things going on behind the scenes that have not
been previously identified as important. Also, there is a significant gap in the current
literature about the BSP. By revealing these aspects of the history of the BSP,
important lessons could be learned about the heritage and formation of present-day
Burmese politics. Key questions that emerge from these events about the party,
relevant to understanding the present-day political situation are: what precisely was
their role in the independence movement? How did they develop their relationship
with Burma’s ruling Tatmadaw? Why has information about that relationship been
suppressed? In order to answer these questions, I examine how the party was formed
as the BSP after independence, and in what ways they continued pre-independence
organisation and ideas. The “40 Lakhs case” shows that funding was obviously
important, but just as important was the effect of the Cold War upon the BSP,
considering that it initiated the Asia Socialist Movement. These questions and issues
appear not to have been addressed in a satisfactory way in any of the existing
literature, either in Burmese or English. By addressing them, I justifying this thesis as
it seeks to thoroughly investigate just how central the BSP and its historical
antecedents, have been in shaping modern Myanmar’s history.

